Policy and scholarly work related to forced displacement typically note the historically high estimates of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) at the outset of their pieces. Tens of millions are estimated to be displaced, according to UNHCR, two-thirds of which are internally displaced within borders.
These figures are important because they convey the scale of the problem, and the stakes involved in addressing it. The most promising advances in our understanding of forced displacement in the last 20 years, however, stem from conceptualizing and explaining the forms of displacement that comprise the overall numbers, and how they reflect different drivers, dynamics, and consequences of forced population movements. In this piece, we focus on displacement defined as “civilian migration that is provoked, directly or indirectly, by one or several armed groups” (Steele, 2017:16).
A first distinction scholars now make is between opportunistic and strategic displacement. Strategic displacement is displacement that is purposefully caused by armed groups in the service of their aims; while opportunistic displacement constitutes attempts to steal land by armed groups or private actors under the cover of war (for instance, despojo in Colombia, see Tellez, 2022).
Making this distinction pushes scholars to theorize why and how armed groups or private actors force people out of their homes and communities and off of their land. In other words, they draw our attention to the politics of forced displacement. These lines of inquiry also give us the tools to consider how the displaced respond, including where they are likely to go (Steele, 2019; Turkoglu and Weber, 2023). Finally, it also allows us to theorize about how the actors governing them respond as well: states, encouraged by international organizations like UNHCR, create de jure policies that combine with informal practices to govern displacement.
Causes of displacement
Armed groups can strategically displace civilians in different ways. Lichtenheld distinguishes among cleansing (the permanent and collective expulsion of particular groups, which could either be based on ethnic or political affiliations), depopulation (the indiscriminate and temporary emptying of particular areas), and forced relocation (the concentration or resettlement of civilians in makeshift camps or proximate urban centres) (Lichtenheld, 2020).
Each type of displacement is more or less likely during civil war, depending on the type of warfare. In conventional civil wars with frontlines and evenly matched armed groups, cleansing is more likely. In insurgencies, which are characterized by an imbalance in military capabilities and government forces that struggle to separate insurgents from civilians, forced relocation is more likely. Lichtenheld argues that forced relocation is a sorting mechanism that allows government forces to identify insurgent sympathizers and exclude them from the civilian population (Lichtenheld, 2020 & forthcoming).
Relatedly, Jentzsch and Steele argue that within and across wars, armed groups aim to control territory and populations, and will use different forms of displacement depending on whether they try to establish social or territorial control first (Jentzsch and Steele, 2023). Armed groups may displace those they perceive to be disloyal out of territory they try to conquer, or incentivize or forcibly relocate people into regions to gain control over them. In northwest Colombia in the early 1990s, counterinsurgents targeted supporters of an insurgent-affiliated political party with violence and threats until they left their homes, expelling them to solidify their control over the territory (Steele, 2011). But armed groups also engage in the opposite: relocating civilians into territories, into camps or settlements such as those created in Uganda, Vietnam, Mozambique, and Nigeria, to solidify their control over people.
When we take the aims and capacities of armed groups into account, it allows us to anticipate whether and in what ways they will try to displace civilians. These causes have implications for policy as well: for example, elections within the context of ongoing civil wars need to be designed very carefully, to avoid revealing civilians’ identities or sympathies (Steele 2017, Steele and Schubiger, 2018), while humanitarian agencies need to be wary of their operations potentially enabling or supporting strategies of forced displacement (Lichtenheld forthcoming). Branch argues that displacement camps created by the UNHCR in Northern Uganda perversely enabled the Ugandan government to engage in large-scale and sustained forced relocation (Branch, 2008).
Consequences and state responses to displacement
Scholars have therefore demonstrated the extent to which forced displacement is not only a negative side effect of other violence, but the product of a wide-ranging set of political factors, including but not limited to the strategic use of displacement to gain territory or information, or the creation of ethnically or politically homogeneous zones (Greenhill, 2010; Steele, 2017; Lichtenheld, 2020).
State responses to this displacement are also shaped by governments’ political goals. States in the Global South employ their own strategies in response to displacement; some mirror those in rich democracies while others differ in important ways (Schwartz, 2023). For example, numerous case studies illustrate how and why states in the Global South treat certain refugees and IDPs favourably, while strategically ignoring or proactively restricting the rights of others irrespective of state capacity (Norman, 2020; Abdelaaty, 2021; Betts, 2013). As such, domestic and international politics factor heavily in explaining variation in the causes of displacement, government responses to displacement, and the consequences that may stem from these responses.
To better understand both variation in government responses to displacement and their potential downstream consequences, we need a systematic accounting of state responses to displacement. A new cross-national dataset, the Developing World Refugee and Asylum Policy database (DWRAP), has made significant contributions towards capturing government responses to forced migration throughout the Global South by indexing national-level asylum legislation (Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022). To extend these data, Lichtenheld and Steele coded data collected by UNHCR’s Global Protection Cluster, which provides cross-national data on states’ laws and policies related to IDPs (Lichtenheld and Steele, 2024). The database is updated regularly based on desk reviews, key informant interviews, a survey of member states, and Protection Cluster coordinators and UNHCR IDP operations (UNHCR, 2022: 14).
Among states that have experienced armed conflicts and internal displacement, Figure 1 (below) shows which have adopted IDP policies and how many they adopted. Our dataset includes a total of 191 policies.
Of the countries that have experienced conflict since 1989, 56 percent, or 43 countries, have adopted some sort of IDP policy. The countries with the most policies are Bosnia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Azerbaijan.
We also see differences across the content of de jure policies that states adopt, which also varies regionally. The data shows that most policies do not guarantee access to citizenship, travel, or identification documents for IDPs. This is important for several reasons. First, if IDPs lack documentation proving that they are citizens, they may be denied access to services, or subjected to arbitrary detention. Second, proof of licenses required to practice a profession might prevent IDPs from earning a living in new locales, and missing death certificates that prove inheritance can impede access to resources (Personal communication to Steele and Lichtenheld, Martina Caterina, UNHCR). Third, many refugees are IDPs first, so lacking documents can complicate the process of achieving refugee status or asylum and lead to statelessness.
One question these data raise is why states have adopted the policies they have. For instance, why do some policies guarantee IDPs’ freedom of movement, while others do not? We can also ask how these “official” policies on paper diverge from practices on the ground, or de facto policies. In partnership with Stephanie Schwartz, we have launched a project to conceptualize and document the intersection of de jure and de facto responses. We believe that while an important focus rests on the gaps in implementation, often the practices diverge from policy – sometimes in a purposeful way – that can actually undermine the official policy (Schwartz, 2023). As a result, we have states that may have de jure liberal policies but illiberal de facto practices that are not simply a matter of failure to implement the policy evenly.
This is especially important to consider given that recent scholarship on state strategies like delegation, indifference, and ambiguity in response to asylum-seeking demonstrates that responses to displacement that are available to states includes actions and inactions that both overlap with and are distinct from national law and administrative policy (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018; Norman, 2020; Abdelaaty, 2021; Stel, 2021). As such, a measure of state responses to displacement must include not only what states say they do on paper, but what they actually do in practice.
Our working concept of responses features two dimensions: if responses are formalized or de facto; and how liberal or illiberal they are. While states often formalize their responses to forced displacement, they do not always adopt policies or legislation to manage refugees or IDPs. At the same time, new research shows that a lack of formal response does not mean inaction by governments (Schwartz, 2023). Our working definition of “de facto” responses is actions that are implemented through policy-making channels and/or by state actors, but not formalized within a policy framework, or through legislation or executive decrees. The concept captures policy implementation with “ambiguity” (Matland, 1995), strategic indifference (Norman, 2020), or delegation (Abdelaaty, 2021). It also captures both informal strategies of state actors and practices – actions that are not explicitly adopted as a strategy but are nonetheless tolerated by authorities (Wood, 2018). We use “de facto” as a broader category that does not presuppose the motivation for the response.
The second dimension of our concept is how liberal or illiberal the response is. We see this dimension as a scale. At one end of the scale are liberal policies that ensure safety in refuge; make asylum, integration, or resettlement accessible to refugees and IDPs; and guarantee political rights. At the other end are illiberal responses that degrade safety and deter access to asylum and integration, often through coercive interventions. As with the possible interaction between formal and de facto responses, states may respond in relatively liberal ways in one area governing the displaced (for instance, political rights or access to education) while implementing more illiberal responses in others (for instance, deterring asylum claims or restricting mobility).
Examples of illiberal de facto responses include the deployment of military or police forces without official grounds to do so, the imposition of targeted curfews, and the reduction of humanitarian aid, education, housing, and healthcare. These kinds of restrictions are meant to make the host country or region less hospitable, and even to trigger return (Schwartz, 2023; Mourad, 2021). Crucially, illiberal de facto responses are consistent with liberal de jure responses.
Working towards a better understanding of state responses to forced displacement
We are working now to document responses across and within states, which will allow us to better account for the politics of government responses to internal and international displacement. The data and theoretical insights generated through this project will be useful for scholars, policymakers, and advocacy organizations looking to understand and influence the governance and management of forced migration, which is only becoming more urgent as global displacement continues to increase in scope and scale.
KEYWORDS: armed conflict, displacement patterns, IDP policy, state response
Abbey Steele is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. She researches the politics of violence, displacement, and responses to it by civilians and states, with a regional focus in Latin America. Her book Democracy and Displacement in Colombia’s Civil War argues that democratic reforms led armed groups to engage in political cleansing, leading to the first waves of internally displaced people in Colombia.
Stephanie Schwartz is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She studies the politics of forced migration, violent conflict, and humanitarian governance. Her current book project, Homeward Bound: Refugee Return and Local Conflict after Civil War, examines how refugee return influences future patterns of conflict and displacement.
Adam Lichtenheld is Executive Director of the Immigration Policy Lab at Stanford University. He has designed and evaluated policies and programs on migration and displacement, violence prevention, and conflict resolution with governments, donor agencies, and NGOs from around the world. His articles have appeared in a number of academic and policy journals, along with media including the Washington Post and Foreign Policy.
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