The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami hit Sri Lanka’s coastal areas hard, causing over 35,000 deaths and displacing more than 500,000 people. Many lost their jobs, and vital services, including schools, roads, water facilities, and electricity stations, were damaged or destroyed. In response, the Sri Lankan government enforced a rule that prevents building homes within 100 meters of the coastline in the South and 200 meters in the North and East. This led to the construction of over 70,000 houses in new resettlement areas, funded by various international and national donors, to help families who lived in the buffer zone before the tsunami.
Many families, who depended on the sea for fishing and related activities or on tourism, were reluctant to move to these new areas, often located far from their original homes. The government struggled to find land near the old settlements, so most new homes were built 10 to 15 kilometers away from where people had lived. It was evident from the interviews conducted with displaced people, who initially stayed in temporary camps and transitory shelters before relocation, that they aspired to settle somewhere close to their previous settlements, mainly in the city of Galle. However, most of them received houses from donor-built settlements in the Akmeemana Divisional Secretariat area. Those families who lived in the buffer zone had to relocate to new places, as they had no other place to stay. As a result, urban dwellers became rural dwellers. However, soon after the tsunami, in considering the buffer zone regulation, a significant proportion of displaced people believed it was the correct decision by the government.
Against this background. this paper examines the situation of tsunami resettlers originally from the buffer zone in Galle city twenty years after their resettlement. The researcher has been tracking the social and economic conditions of relocated families in both small (fewer than fifty homes) and large (more than fifty homes) settlements in the Akmeemana area for the past 20 years.
Interviews conducted with these families at different times—shortly after the disaster, later on, and much later—helped the researcher identify four groups: original resettlers who followed the buffer zone rule, new settlers who bought homes from tsunami survivors who returned to the buffer zone or other places, original settlers who live both in new settlements and the buffer zone, and those who received homes in the new areas but decided to move back to the buffer zone.
It is evident from the interviews conducted with relocated families that they had to struggle with the distance to Galle city for income-earning activities, especially fishermen, who struggled to access the sea after relocation. Resettlers were also unsatisfied with the quality of housing units received from donors. For instance, most of them complained that their houses were not constructed with durable building materials and lacked common infrastructure and services, i.e., proper access roads, streetlights, garbage collection systems, a lack of proper drains for wastewater disposal, and a postal service. They further complained that their income was insufficient to meet daily expenses, including new expenses for travelling to Galle city, not needed before. As a result, some families moved back to the buffer zone, renting or selling their new houses, which is illegal. By this time, the former 100-meter buffer zone had been reduced to 50 meters in some areas in the Gale city area, and the Coast Conservation Department Officials did not strictly monitor the new developments of people moving back to the zone, which could be due to political pressure from the government.
It is important to note that some individuals affected by the tsunami who returned to their previous residences had to rebuild their homes without any financial support from the government. This group primarily used funds obtained from the illegal sale of the housing units they had received from relocated settlements. It took nearly ten years or more for them to receive the original deeds associated with these relocated properties. By that time, many tsunami-relocated families had moved back, mainly to the buffer zone or other areas, by selling or renting their houses and signing agreements in front of a lawyer with the renter or new buyer.
According to the government land officer responsible for overseeing land in the area, tsunami-affected families cannot sell their land to outsiders until they receive the original deed from the government. Even after obtaining their deeds, there is an additional ten-year restriction mentioned in the deed. As a result, once the property is sold to outsiders, it cannot be transferred to new buyers until they pay an extra fee based on the government valuer’s assessment. Those who sold their houses intended to transfer ownership to new buyers once they received their deeds but were unable to do so due to these new restrictions. Consequently, outsiders (or newcomers) are now facing a deadlock, as they must pay an additional amount to the government on top of what they paid the original owners to transfer the deed into their names.
Originally, relocated families received their deeds from the government at least ten years after their relocation. By that time, two-thirds of those families had already returned to the buffer zone or other areas. Additionally, one-third of the original tsunami settlers who received deeds from the government are unable to sell their properties for another ten years.
Interviews with individuals who moved back to the buffer zone reveal that they now understand what a tsunami is, where to run, and believe they will receive timely evacuation calls from relevant authorities. However, they remain uncertain about the fate of their movable and immovable property in the event of another tsunami. They believe that if their property is damaged due to a tsunami or other coastal hazards, government authorities will assist them in reconstruction, implying they expect government support to rebuild their homes.
Given this context, one must ask: why did the government reimpose the buffer zone regulation shortly after the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami as a disaster risk reduction strategy, spending millions of Sri Lankan rupees on planned relocation, only to face failure twenty years later? As evidenced by interviews in 2024/2025 conducted with those who returned to the buffer zone and those who remain in relocated settlements, infrastructure issues, such as access roads, bridges, community development centers, water supply, and poor drainage systems, as well as service quality issues, such as public transport from settlements to the city and a lack of employment opportunities, forced many to move back to the buffer zone or elsewhere.
According to those who returned to the buffer zone, they preferred to remain in their relocation settlements. They were reluctant to leave due to their experiences of the tsunami destruction. However, upon moving into the relocated settlements, they faced ongoing challenges related to infrastructure and income for an unpredictable period, ultimately leading them to decide to return. Most individuals moved out of the relocated settlements within the first ten years, indicating that they had stayed long enough to assess their ability to adapt to the situation.
Different governments have made promises to improve the socio-economic conditions of relocated families; however, these commitments have not been fulfilled due to budgetary constraints. This situation has been exacerbated by the conflict between the Sri Lankan army and the Tamil Tigers, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the collapse of the Sri Lankan economy. It typically took five to ten years after the relocation of these families before the necessary infrastructure was provided in the settlements. By that time, many families had already moved out.
Recent research on families still residing in these settlements, even twenty years later, found that only one-third have managed to escape the poverty that followed on from the tsunami and relocation. The remaining families continue to live in poverty and do not have an optimistic view of the future. In essence, this group risks remaining trapped in the cycle of poverty unless they receive support from external sources. When asked about the type of assistance they need, a significant number of respondents expressed a desire for skills training and financial resources to create income-generating opportunities. If not, remaining households intend to sell their houses and move back to the buffer zone or elsewhere. Families now living in the buffer zone were asked whether the government’s decision to reimpose the buffer zone regulation soon after the 2004 tsunami was a correct decision or not. Twenty years later, a significant proportion of families interviewed now state that it was the wrong decision by the government. This is mainly due to the failure of the relocation settlements to provide basic infrastructure and services, their inconvenient location away from the city of Galle, and the difficulty of finding employment in the new area.
The Coast Conservation Department did not strictly enforce the regulation. For instance, when people slowly returned to the buffer zone, the Coast Conservation Department could have demolished the new constructions according to the powers given in the act, but they did not do so, mainly due to political pressure. As a result, relocated people gradually moved back to the buffer zone. As such, it is hard to see a buffer zone nowadays in Galle. On the other hand, there has been no tsunami since 2004, and only a few warnings. Therefore, people think it was not a correct decision by the government to reimpose the buffer zone regulation, as people think that tsunamis are infrequent disasters. Nevertheless, what’s important to note here is that the failure of the planned relocation forced the relocated families to move back as the only option. In this context, the research findings call into question not the government’s decision to relocate tsunami-affected people but rather improper planning and implementation of the settlements. These settlements can be called development disasters.
Interviews with individuals who purchased houses from families relocated due to the tsunami reveal that their primary motivation for buying these homes was the low prices. However, many buyers were unaware that these houses cannot be sold to outsiders and were provided to the tsunami-affected families under special conditions. As a result, the new residents cannot legally occupy these settlements without a proper deed, as the houses are registered in the government land registry under the names of the original tsunami-displaced families, who no longer reside in these homes.
Drawing on various studies conducted over time on the relocated settlements in Galle, researchers have identified a group of families who live in both the relocated settlement and their former homes situated in the buffer zone. In-depth interviews with these families revealed multiple reasons for this dual residency. Most families in this category expressed their intention not to sell their old houses to outsiders, as such sales are currently illegal. However, they plan to reconsider their options after ten years, when they will be eligible to sell. Some families intend to keep the house in the relocated settlement as a dowry for their children and plan to move back to the buffer zone later on. A few families wish to maintain ownership of both homes without selling either to outsiders, thereby taking advantage of the benefits offered by both locations.
Conclusion
The tsunami-affected people were relocated to donor-built settlements as a disaster risk reduction strategy in response to buffer zone regulations. Reflecting on the situation 20 years later, it is clear that these individuals were not moved to well-planned settlements close to their original homes. Consequently, many faced difficulties coping with the stresses and risks associated with their relocation, which came as a shock to them. Their aspirations were crushed due to the harsh economic and social conditions they encountered after the move.
In this context, they received minimal assistance from the government and non-governmental organisations to improve their living situations. As a result, many relocated families chose to return to the buffer zone shortly after their relocation, often renting or selling their new homes, which was illegal. This return further exposed them to the risks of tsunamis and other coastal hazards.
The planning of the relocation settlements was inadequate and implemented hastily due to pressure from displaced families. Although government and non-government officials were actively involved during the initial stages of the relocation, they provided little support during the later stages, when it was most needed. The experience of the massive relocations following the 2004 tsunami clearly demonstrated that this effort was a failure and another development disaster. The lack of community involvement and a people-centred approach, a non-integrated approach with relevant stakeholders, and insufficient funding and knowledge, largely contributed to this outcome.
Nishara Fernando is a Professor of Sociology at the Department of Sociology, University of Colombo. He has conducted longitudinal research on families displaced and relocated due to tsunamis, landslides, and floods in Sri Lanka.
KEYWORDS: Tsunami, Disaster Displacement, IDPs, Planned Relocation, Sri Lanka
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